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SUMMARY OF STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER J. MINER 
TO BE SUBMITTED AT JOINT HEARING ON JULY 11, 1990 
The addition of the words "whether published or unpublished" 
to section 107 of Title 17, the "fair use" statute, is 
unnecessary, if intended to permit fair use of unpublished 
material; incompatible with the existing statute, if intended to 
afford equal dignity to published and unpublished matter; and 
ineffective to resolve the policy concerns articulated by the 
sponsors. The amendment is unnecessary if its only purpose is to 
permit fair use of unpublished material. The present statute 
allows the fair use of any copyrighted work, although the nature 
of the work is one of the fair use factors to be considered. The 
other factors are purpose and character of the use; the amount 
and substantiality of the portions used; and the effect of the 
use upon the potential market. No court ever has said that 
unpublished material cannot be the subject of fair use. 
Read in the context of section 107 as it stands, the 
amendment appears to be intended to raise unpublished material to 
the level of published material in the application of fair use 
doctrine. If this is the intention of the amendment, then the 
amendment is inconsistent with the fair use factor just referred 
to, the nature of the work. This factor tells us that there is 
an important distinction between published and unpublished works, 
and the courts have offered far less fair use protection to 
unpublished works. The important reason for·the distinction lies 
in the right of an author to control the first public appearance 
of his or her work. Even in its present form, the statute allows 
fair use of an unpublished work stolen from an author. The 
amendment indicates no disapproval of such a use. 
The concerns of the sponsors relate to the stringent 
restrictions imposed by the courts on the use of unpublished 
material by historians, researchers and biographers. An 
examination of court decisions reveals that the unpublished 
nature of a work has been a key factor in defeating fair use 
claims. The recently-ratified Berne Convention seems to set up 
another barrier against the fair use of unpublished material. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be no reason to allow the heirs of 
historical figures long departed to forestall the use of material 
created generations earlier but recently discovered by a scholar 
conducting research in some remote archive. The solution to that 
problem does not lie in this bill. 
I propose a solution that is compatible with the provisions 
of the Berne Convention, that would eliminate the difficulties 
encountered by courts in deciding fair use claims involving 
unpublished works, and that would accommodate the needs of 
scholars to gain access to material of historical and public 
interest. I would limit fair use to published and publicly 
disseminated material. I would define publicly disseminated 
material to include any letters sent without a requirement of 
confidentiality and any documents, including letters, that have 
been in existence for a certain period of years without having 
been copyrighted. For the rest, I would rely on the freedom of 
access to facts and ideas contained in the undisseminated 
material. In this way, the balance between the rights of authors 
and the rights of society would be maintained. 
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I am happy to accept your invitation to comment on H.R. 4263 
and s. 2370, identical bills providing for the amendment of 
section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code, the "fair use" 
statute. The amendment merely would add the words "whether 
published or unpublished" following the phrase "fair use of a 
copyrighted work." The bills are driven by concerns arising from 
recent court decisions said to unduly restrict the use of 
unpublished, copyrighted material. I am the author of one of 
those decisions. One sponsor has expressed the hope that the 
proposed legislation will "forestall the adoption of a broad and 
inflexible rule against fair use of unpublished material." 
The perception here seems to be that there is a court-fueled 
trend toward depriving scholars and historical researchers of the 
use of letters, diaries and other unpublished writings vital to 
their work. According to the House sponsor, the "amendment would 
clarify that section 107 applies equally to unpublished as well 
as published works." If that is its purpose, it is inconsistent 
with the unamended portion of section 107. I respectfully 
suggest, moreover, that the fair use doctrine cannot and should 
not be applied to published and unpublished material equally. I 
think that the statement should be amended to limit fair use to 
published and publicly disseminated works, a proposal advanced in 
my article: Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play in 
the October 1989 issue of the Journal of the Copyright Society of 
the U.S.A. With an appropriate definition of "publicly 
disseminated" added to the statute, the concerns of the sponsors 
would be allayed, the purposes of the fair use doctrine would be 
fulfilled, and societal interests would be served. 
It is important first to examine what fair use is and what 
it is not. Fair use, known as fair abridgement in early English 
law, permits the limited use of a copyrighted work without 
liability for infringement of the copyright. It has been 
characterized as an equitable rule of reason and is necessary for 
such purposes as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship and research. Fair use is not a doctrine to be 
invoked in order to gain access to facts and ideas embodied in 
copyrighted work, because the protection of copyright does not 
extend to facts and ideas. It extends only to expression. There 
thus is struck, in the words of the Supreme Court, "a 
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the 
Copyright Act." Fair use, then, is a limited right to use the 
expression of another. Whether a use is fair is largely 
committed to the judgment of the courts, broadly guided by the 
factors set out in section 107 of Title 17. 
I suggest that the proposed amendment to section 107 bears 
close examination in light of the second fair use factor, which 
remains undisturbed by the amendment. That factor, the nature of 
the copyrighted work, requires the courts to take into account 
whether the work is published or unpublished. History and 
precedent tell us that the scope of fair use is narrower in the 
case of an unpublished copyrighted work than it is in the case of 
a published copyrighted work. The amendment seems to offer equal 
dignity to both types of works and therefore is inconsistent with 
the present application of the fair use doctrine. One can only 
guess at the confusion that would be engendered by the co-
existence of these incompatible provisions. 
If the purpose of the bill is simply to assure that fair use 
can be made of unpublished copyrighted material, it is 
unnecessary. Fair use of unpublished material already is 
permitted. Section 107 allows the fair use of any copyrighted 
work although, as previously noted, the nature of the work is a 
factor to be considered by the courts in applying the doctrine. 
Also to be considered, of course, are the other three statutory 
factors: the purpose and character of the use, the amount and 
substantiality of the portions used, and the effect of the use 
upon the potential market. 
There is some indication in the legislative history of 
section 107 of an intention to restate existing fair use doctrine 
and not to change it in any respect. A persuasive case can be 
made that the then existing doctrine prohibited the fair use of 
unpublished but not voluntarily disseminated works. The statute 
as enacted did not make the distinction, leaving it to the courts 
to weigh the unpublished nature of the work in the fair use 
balance. For good reason, the courts have chosen to afford far 
less fair use protection to those who use unpublished material 
then to those who use published material. It is, after all, an 
author's right to control the first public appearance of his or 
her work. An author must have the right to refine, revise and 
discard a work prior to publication. The ability of an author to 
withhold a work from public dissemination just as long as he or 
she deems it proper to do so implicates notions of privacy, 
freedom to refrain from speaking and control of material. At 
bottom here is a substantial property interest. 
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Essential to an understanding of the effect of the proposed 
amendment is the fact that the unpublished material for which a 
claim of fair use is made sometimes is stolen material. In 
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, the leading case on fair use, 
the Supreme Court spoke of the exploitation of a "purloined 
manuscript," the manuscript being the memoirs of President Gerald 
Ford. In Salinger v. Random House, the biographer gained access 
to certain letters written by J.D. Salinger lodged in a library 
by promising not to copy them. New Era Publications v. Henry 
Holt and Co. involved the use of the writings of L. Ron Hubbard 
apparently acquired from the Church of Scientology by 
misappropriation or conversion. There is nothing in the present 
statute or in the cases interpreting it to indicate that 
purloined material cannot be the subject of fair use. That the 
exploited text is stolen simply is not a factor to be considered 
in applying the fair use doctrine under section 107 as it stands. 
The amendment proposed, which seeks only to elevate the status of 
unpublished material, does nothing to rectify this situation and 
actually exacerbates it. 
The concerns of historians and researchers in regard to the 
stringent restrictions on the use of unpublished material is 
understandable. It is especially understandable to me, because 
my wife is an historian who has undertaken considerable original 
research. Although no court has said that unpublished material 
never can be the subject of fair use, it is clear that the 
unpublished nature of a work is a key factor in defeating a fair 
use claim. It makes no sense, however, to allow the heirs of 
historical figures long departed to forestall, by the simple 
expedient of obtaining a copyright, the use of material created 
generations earlier and discovered in some remote archive by a 
scholar researching original sources. The solution to the 
problem thus posed is not, in my view, to elevate unpublished 
works to equal standing with published works in the fair use 
analysis. As I have demonstrated, such an approach would 
encourage the use of purloined material, deprive authors of 
important rights and encroach upon interests that should be 
protected. Moreover, the recently-ratified Berne Convention 
seems to exclude the use of unpublished material altogether. It 
allows only "quotations from a work which already has been made 
available to the public, provided that their making is compatible 
with fair practice." 
I propose a solution that is compatible with the provisions 
of the Berne Convention, that would eliminate the difficulties 
encountered by courts in deciding fair use claims involving 
unpublished works, and that would accommodate the needs of 
scholars to gain access to material of historical and public 
interest. I would limit fair use to published and publicly 
disseminated material. I would define publicly disseminated 
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material to include any letters sent without a requirement of 
confidentiality and any documents, including letters, that have 
been in existence for a certain period of years without having 
been copyrighted. For the rest, I would rely on the freedom of 
access to facts and ideas contained in the undisseminated 
material. In this way, the balance between the rights of authors 
and the rights of society would be maintained. 
It always should be remembered, as the Supreme Court has 
reminded us, that "[b]y establishing a marketable right to the 
use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas." It also should be 
recognized that strict application of the copyright law could 
defeat incremental progress, to the detriment of the public good. 
The fair use doctrine was designed to avoid that result. 
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